When US President Barack Obama visited India in November 2010 he asked vice-president Hamid Ansari, one of India's best expert on Iran, how to deal with Tehran. "Then, you'll never get the carpet," Ansari reportedly retorted. Obama purportedly replied that he did not have the time or the patience for prolonged negotiations. However, a nuclear-armed Iran could pose a proliferation and security threat not only to the region, but also to India indirectly (given its linkages with Pakistan's and North Korea's programmes) and directly. Simultaneously, Tehran has publicly criticized the recent strategic partnership agreement between Kabul and Washington and has reportedly revived its links with the Taliban, with the objective of overthrowing the Afghan government, further challenging India's interests in Afghanistan. Instead, Iran is likely to get off scot free and also be rewarded through enhanced trade ties. Consequently, this vital alternative route for India into Afghanistan isn't operational and is unlikely to be completed even in the not too distant future, thus holding Indian interests hostage to Tehran's whims. In fact, the real challenge to Indo-Iranian bilateral relations is likely to come from Tehran's nuclear aspirations, its support of terrorism overseas, its reticence to support the alternative route to Afghanistan and its increasing tilt towards the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as New Delhi's inability to reply to these. However, for lots of reasons India's relations with Iran are likely to get much more tricky and, perhaps, unmanageable. Similarly, the brazen attacks in New Delhi against Israelis, allegedly undertaken at the behest of Tehran, not only expose India to a whole new source of terrorism, but also reveal a worrying inconsistency in reacting to such attacks. On the nuclear front, while India has maintained that it is not keen on Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, it has done precious little diplomatically to ensure this likelihood. Ansari's response reflects India's enviable record in dealing with Iran, particularly its ability to maintain relations even after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which marked a major break in relations between Tehran and Western capitals, particularly Washington. While New Delhi's convenient explanation is that its relations with Tehran have been complicated by the threat of US-led Western sanctions, this is only part of the picture. Finally, while India had hoped that Iran would be a useful ally in Afghanistan, Tehran has not proved to be a reliable partner. So far New Delhi has not responded to these threats successfully and despite its avowed faith in negotiating with Tehran, it may still not get its Persian carpets. |